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Indigenous and Anthropological Theories of  Ethnic 
Conflict in Kalimantan
Frank Fanselow
Abstract: This paper analyses indigenous and anthropological attempts to understand several out-
breaks of  ethnic violence that occurred around the time of  the 1998 Indonesian Reform in Kalimantan, 
the Indonesian part of  Borneo.  Violence between immigrant Madurese and indigenous Dayaks had 
occurred regularly in the western and central provinces of  Kalimantan since the intensification of  the 
transmigration policy in the 1970s but it increased dramatically with the collapse of  Suharto’s New 
Order.  Between 1997 and 2001 there were three major outbreaks of  communal violence that attracted 
a great deal of  sensationalist media reporting in part because they involved archaic forms of  violence 
such as headhunting and cannibalism.  This paper is concerned primarily with the different theories 
that have been put forward to explain the violence, rather than with the ‘facts’ of  the conflict about 
which a number of  reports have already been written.  Social scientists who have worked in the area 
generally reduce the ethnic conflict to economic competition over resources between two marginalised 
groups.  This interpretation of  the conflict has been ‘fed back’ into the society by the media and is 
vehemently rejected by the Dayaks themselves, who have not only developed an alternative theory 
of  the conflict but also a critique of  anthropological interpretations.  They interpret the conflict as a 
‘clash of  cultures’ between Madurese and Dayak traditions (adat) and dismiss the reduction of  cultural 
differences to economic factors as yet another form of  cultural imperialism in a long history of  mis-
representation of  Dayak society in which outsiders have imposed their categories of  understanding 
on Dayak culture.  They argue that the conflict can only be resolved if  it is understood through the 
categories of  Dayak culture itself  and managed within the framework of  conflict resolution methods 
available in Dayak culture.
Keywords: anthropology, ethnic conflict, post-Suharto Indonesia, indigenous minorities
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* This paper is based on field research carried out in West and Central Kalimantan in the immediate 
aftermath of  the violence in 2001 which was facilitated by research leave from University Brunei 
Darussalam. An earlier version of  the paper was presented at  the conference on “Indigenous 
Theories of  Conflict” organised by the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, Davao, Philippines, 
December 2001. I would like to thank the Institute for Research in Humanities of  Kyoto University, 
and in particular my host Professor Masakazu Tanaka, for giving me the opportunity to expand and 
revise the paper during my appointment as Visiting Professor in 2012.




Outbreaks of  ethnic violence between indigenous ethnic groups and transmigrants 
from other parts of  Indonesia have regularly occurred in Kalimantan since the 1970s, but the 
scale and intensity of  such violence escalated greatly immediately with the disintegration 
of  Suharto’s New Order.  In the years after 1997 there was a series of  outbreaks of  ethnic 
violence that were at the time highly sensationalised in the national and international media 
because they involved instances of  apparently archaic conspicuous forms of  violence such as 
headhunting and cannibalism1.  The violence occurred mainly between the indigenous inhab-
itants of  Borneo, belonging to a multitude of  different ethnic groups that are collectively 
known as Dayaks, and recent transmigrants from the small and densely populated island of  
Madura in the Java Sea.
Between 1966 and 1998 about 300,000 Madurese were resettled in Kalimantan with the 
largest concentrations in West and Central Kalimantan.2  The most serious outbreaks of  
The four provinces of  Kalimantan in the Indonesian part of  the island of  Borneo  
(source: googlemaps)
 1 “Bloody Borneo”, TIME (12th March 2001).
 2 Oxford Analytica Weekly Column, (15th March 2001) (www.oxan.com).
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violence occurred in January–February 1997 in the Sanggau and in March–April 1999 in the 
Sambas regions of  West Kalimantan and in February–March 2001 around Sampit in Central 
Kalimantan.  The total death toll in these conflicts reached at least 1200 people by official 
counts (though some unofficial estimates put the number as high as 8000 dead) and about 
163,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who live either in refugee camps in Kalimantan 
or have fled back to Madura.  In addition to human losses, there was massive destruction of  
property, including the burning down of  more than 6000 houses.  These conflicts were among 
the most serious outbreaks of  ethnic violence in recent Indonesian history.
2. The Events
In this paper I will only briefly summarise the sequence of  actual events because a 
number of  detailed factual reports based on inquiries held by various NGOs are available. 
Human Rights Watch Asia (HRW) has published a report on the 1997 outbreak in West 
Kalimantan3, and the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the February–
March 2001 outbreak in Central Kalimantan4.  Shorter accounts have been published by the 
Asian Human Rights Commission (HRC)5, the Defense for Political Prisoners in Indonesia 
Campaign (TAPOL)6, the UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)7, 
and the British NGO Down to Earth (DTE)8.  The following section briefly summarises the 
events as they are detailed in these reports.  This will provide the necessary background for 
the rest of  the paper in which I examine various theoretical narratives put forward by the 
actors themselves (i.e. the Dayak, the Madurese, the Security Forces) as well as by outside 
observers (mainly anthropologists and other social scientists and activists).  The paper con-
cludes by locating these theories within the dynamics of  the conflict situation itself, rather 
than treating them as post facto theoretical formulations.
 3 Communal Violence in West Kalimantan, Human Rights Watch, (1997) (www.hrw.org/reports/
wkali).
 4 Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan, International Crisis Group, Asia 
Report N.18 (27th June 2001).
 5 Development Inspires Violence in Central Kalimantan, Asian Human Rights Commission—Human 
Rights SOLIDARITY Vol. 11, No. 4 (April 2001).
 6 Deadly conflict in Central Kalimantan, TAPOL: the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, Bulletin 
Online 161 (March/April 2001) (www.gn.apc.org/tapol/161nhead.htm).
 7 UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs: Situation Report on Central Kalimantan. 
No. 1 (25th February 2001), No. 2 (1st March 2001), No. 3 (2nd March 2001).
 8 Killings in West Kalimantan—Indonesia. Down to Earth Action Alert (20 Feb. 2001).




At the time West Kalimantan (Kalimantan Barat or Kalbar) had a population of  about 
3 million.  The two major population groups in the province are the Dayaks and the Malays, 
each constituting about 40% of  the total population.  Many of  the Malays are descendents 
of  members of  indigenous groups who converted to Islam under the influence of  various 
sultanates along the coast, such as the sultanates of  Sambas and Pontianak.  Although some 
Malays still remember their Dayak ancestry, once converted to Islam they become Malays 
and are no longer regarded as Dayaks.  Malays are found in greater numbers on the coastal 
plains, whereas the Dayaks are more numerous in the interior regions.  In addition to these 
two main groups about 13% of  the population is Chinese, living mainly in urban areas, like 
the town of  Singkawang that is predominantly Chinese.  The province has one of  the highest 
concentrations of  Chinese in Indonesia which is the result of  large-scale migration during 
the gold rush of  the late 18th and early 19th centuries when this part of  Borneo was one 
of  the world’s major gold producing regions.  The rest of  the population are a diverse range 
of  transmigrants from other parts of  Indonesia, most of  whom were re-settled there during 
the height of  the transmigration programmes in the 1970s and 1980s.  These include the 
Madurese as well as Javanese, Bugis, Batak, Balinese and others.  The Madurese constitute 
just under 3% of  the total population of  the province as a whole, but before the recent ethnic 
violence they constituted more than 5% of  the population in the districts of  Sambas and 
Sanggau which had the highest concentration of  Madurese.
Prior to the violence in 1997, there had been at least seven violent clashes between 
Madurese and Dayaks in the province since the 1970s.  These often started with the alleged 
murder or rape of  a Dayak by a Madurese, which in turn led to Dayak retaliation.  In all these 
cases the violence was quickly contained and remained localised and the number of  casual-
ties was limited (the worst such incident occurred in 1983 near Pontianak and led to the death 
of  12 people).  This pattern changed in January 1997 when the conflict escalated to engulf  
a large part of  the province, particularly Sambas and Sanggau Districts and left about 500 
people dead and 20,000 displaced.  This incident triggered off  a full-scale ethnic confronta-
tion that engulfed wide areas of  West Kalimantan when Dayaks and Madurese attacked each 
other’s settlements and set up roadblocks hunting down each other.  After about three weeks 
of  violence 500 people were left dead, although unofficial estimates put the number as high 
at 3000.
A second episode of  communal violence occurred in March and April 1999 further north 
from Pontianak in Sambas, the seat of  a pre-colonial Malay sultanate.  The clashes left 200 
dead and about 35,000 Madurese displaced, most of  whom found safety in refugee camps 
in Pontianak.  In October 2000 and in July 2001 smaller outbreaks of  violence occurred in 
Pontianak between Madurese IDPs and local Malays and Dayaks.
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2. 2. Central Kalimantan
The province of  Central Kalimantan (Kalimantan Tengah or Kalteng) was established in 
1957 by dividing the previous province of  South Kalimantan (Kalimantan Selatan or Kalsel) 
into an overwhelmingly Muslim southern part around the capital of  the pre-colonial sultan-
ate of  Banjarmasin and a separate predominantly Dayak province of  Central Kalimantan. 
The division occurred in response to a brief  Dayak insurrection again Banjar Malay domi-
nance.  Central Kalimanatan is one of  least developed and most sparsely populated provinces 
of  Indonesia but a major logging centre.  Since the establishment of  Central Kalimantan the 
demographic composition of  the province has been substantially changed by informal migra-
tion from South Kalimantan and formal transmigration from Java, Madura and Bali.  At the 
time of  the violence only about 60% of  the population of  the province’s 1.8 million popula-
tion were Dayaks.  Of  these about two thirds are Muslims and the rest are either Christian 
or follow ‘traditional’ Dayak religion.  The other 40% of  the province’s population was made 
up of  immigrants, most of  them Banjar Malays and about 6–7% percent Madurese.  Like in 
West Kalimantan, the Dayaks are found more in the interior upriver parts of  the province. 
The (trans)migrants live mostly in urban areas, particularly in Sampit, Pangkalanbun and 
the provincial capital of  Palangkaraya.  Before the recent violence, the highest concentration 
of  Madurese was found in the logging town of  Sampit, where they made up about 60% of  
the population compared to only 10% Dayak.
As was the case in West Kalimantan, there is a long history of  violent incidents between 
Dayak and Madurese in Central Kalimantan involving at least 15 incidents since 1982.  But 
during the authoritarian ‘New Order’ regime these remained localized and limited.  This 
changed at the beginning of  2001 when ethnic violence occurred over wide areas and left hun-
dreds dead and led to a mass exodus of  Madurese from the province.  Surviving Madurese 
fled to the provincial capital Palangkaraya or north to the town of  Pangkalanbun, near the 
border with West Kalimantan, from where many were evacuated by ship to Madura so that by 
mid-April 108,000 refugees had already left the province.  According to official figures about 
500 people were killed, although unofficial estimates put the number as high as 3000.  Except 
for those in the town of  Pangkalanbun, almost all Madurese fled from Central Kalimantan. 
Local Dayak leaders in the town had set a deadline for Madurese to leave Pangkalanbun, but 
the government claimed that they would not allow this forced expulsion.  Nevertheless of  
the 45,000 Madurese in the town only 25,000 remained, the last remaining concentration of  
Madurese in Central Kalimantan.
3. The Narratives
3. 1. Rising Fundamentalism: Another Muslim-Christian Conflict?
Initial reports of  the violence in Kalimantan in the Indonesian media tended to represent 
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them as another case of  religious conflict between Muslims and Christians.  The violence in 
Central Kalimantan in March 1999 occurred at a time when Muslim-Christian conflicts had 
just started in Ambon (Malaku) in January 1999 and in Poso (Sulawesi) in December 1998, 
April–June 2000, and in November–December 2001.  The initial reaction of  the national media 
was to contextualise the violence in West Kalimantan in early 1997 as essentially another 
religious conflict threatening national unity, this time between Christian Dayaks and Muslim 
Madurese9.  This interpretation was made plausible by the fact that the Madurese have a 
long-standing reputation of  being devout Muslims and are well known for their long tradi-
tion of  religious scholarship10, whereas many Dayaks (the exact numbers are uncertain) have 
been converted to Christianity by missionaries since the late 19th century.  The interpretation 
seemed to be further confirmed by attacks on a Catholic church in Sanggau Ledo and on a 
Christian NGO school hostel in which two girls were stabbed that started the violence in 1997, 
and the burning down of  a mosque and several suraus (prayer rooms) used by Madurese.
But the religious narrative was quickly disputed by both sides involved in the conflict. 
Following the 1997 violence in West Kalimantan local Muslim leaders on both sides issued 
a joint statement denying that religious factors were behind the violence11.  Dayak leaders in 
particular denied that their hostility towards the Madurese was due to religious differences 
and insisted that this was an ethnic conflict.  They pointed out that in Sambas the violence 
in March 1999 did not originally start between Madurese and Dayaks but between Madurese 
and Malays, who are also Muslims.  It was only once the violence had started that the Dayaks 
joined the Malays against the Madurese.  Indeed, even the local Chinese were reported to have 
supported the Dayaks and Malays.
The ethnic situation is rather different in Central Kalimantan.  In contrast to West 
Kalimantan, where conversion to Islam implies a change of  ethnic identity to Malay, here 
a large proportion of  the population are Muslim Dayaks, a designation that would be an 
oxymoron in West Kalimantan where conversion to Islam leads to assimilation into the 
Malay ethnicity.  The reason for this difference in usage of  the terms lies in the long histori-
cal antagonisms between Dayaks and Malays in the southern part of  Kalimantan.  South 
Kalimantan was the centre of  the powerful pre-colonial sultanate of  Banjarmasin and was 
politically and economically dominated by Banjar Malays.  Central Kalimantan came into 
existence in 1957 as a predominantly Dayak province as the result of  a division in 1957 of  the 
province of  South Kalimantan which was the result of  a Dayak revolt against Banjar Malay 
domination.  Dayak converts to Islam therefore did not adopt a Malay identity but remained 
 9 Down To Earth: Action Alert, (20th February 1997).
 10 Iik Ariffin Mansurnoor. Islam in an Indonesian World: Ulama of  Madura. Yogjakarta: Gadjah 
Mada University Press, 1990.
 11 Down To Earth: Action Alert, (20th February 1997).
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(Muslim) Dayaks.  Indeed some of  the most outspoken Dayak leaders, including K.M. Usop, a 
philosophy professor and former Rector of  Palangkaraya University, who was arrested (and 
released) on charges of  incitement of  anti-Madurese violence, are Muslims.
This religious narrative has to be placed in the wider context of  a secular nationalist 
narrative at the time of  a nation under thread from rising religious tensions.  It contextual-
ised the events in Kalimantan by fitting them into a wider picture of  rising religious divi-
sions threatening the unity of  the nation that needed a powerful government (i.e. the Suharto 
government) and its strong arm (i.e. the security forces) to avert disintegration.  Raising the 
spectre of  divisive religious divisions in post-Suharto era reinforced the secular nationalist 
narrative of  the national elite.
3. 2. Conspiracy Theories
Not only was the religious narrative rejected by Dayak and Madurese leaders, but it was 
discredited as a conspiracy theory used by the old “New Order” deep state to manipulate 
ethnic conflict for its own political purposes.  Suspicions that the violence was the result of  
political manipulation from the centre gained wide currency locally.  It should be remembered 
that the conflicts occurred during a period of  rapid political change in Indonesia and that 
various political forces both at the national and provincial level were seeking to position 
themselves for the future as the New Order was breaking up and a post-Suharto political 
system was in the process of  emerging.
While both Dayaks and Madurese held deep suspicions that the violence was deliber-
ately allowed to go out of  control by the security forces, the security forces in turn blamed 
their reduced powers and limited resources that stretched their ability to control such sudden 
massive unrest.  There can be little doubt that as opposition to the involvement of  the armed 
forces in politics grew at the national level, previously suppressed communal conflicts in 
various parts of  the country emerged into the open.  But at the same time the security forces 
themselves were widely accused of  having a hand in creating instability in order to create a 
climate of  insecurity in which the government would have to depend on them to re-establish 
order.  The March 1999 violence in Sambas, for example, came at a time when the government 
of  President Abdul Rahman Wahid was trying to restrict the role of  the armed forces (TNI) 
to external defence and leave the police (POLRI) in charge of  internal security.  The military 
used the violence in West Kalimantan and in Maluku as a justification for the expansion of  
Military Command Regions (Kodams), a system of  military administration reaching down to 
the village level.  In the case of  Central Kalimantan, a couple of  months before the eruption 
of  violence, the former head of  Indonesian intelligence agency, General Zen Maulani (who 
himself  hails from South Kalimantan), visited the province and reportedly told the press that 
intelligence agencies had uncovered a plot for the province to secede from Indonesia and to 
declare a separate state of  Borneo with the Sultan of  Brunei as head of  state and himself  
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as prime minister.  Such “revelations” gained little credence and were instead suspected to 
be a ploy to destabilize the situation by raising fears among transmigrants of  an impending 
Dayak take-over and a subsequent secession, which only the military could prevent.
Whatever the truth behind these conspiracy theories may be, the fact that they gained 
credibility among actors in the conflict is an indication of  the lack of  confidence among all 
both Dayaks and Madurese in the intentions and effectiveness of  the security forces.  Indeed 
each side suspected the security forces to be partial to the other.  In the March 1999 violence 
in Sambas the Madurese suspected that the military was forewarned of  the attacks on them 
and had trucks ready to move them out and police officers profited by buying the property 
of  fleeing Madurese very cheaply.  The same happened in the March 2001 violence in Sampit, 
where police and military were reported to be demanding money from Madurese refugees 
before allowing them to board ships to flee.  In Pangkalanbun there was even an exchange of  
fire between police and army over the collection of  such monies from refugees.  The Dayaks, 
on the other hand, suspected the police to side with the Madurese.  For example, Madurese 
criminals who had attacked or stole from Dayaks were widely believed to be allowed by the 
police to escape to Madura, which was one of  the reasons given by Dayaks for taking justice 
into their own hands.  The Dayak also complain that various important officials, such as 
the head of  police of  Central Kalimantan, were (at least partly) Madurese.  Both sides also 
accused the security forces of  having supplied guns to the other side.
While such conspiracy theories may explain how outside political actors exploit local 
ethnic antagonisms to their own advantage, they do not explain the root causes of  the hostil-
ity between Dayak and Madurese.  Even proponents of  such conspiracy theories acknowl-
edged that the security forces did not instigate the violence themselves, but that once the 
rioters realized that—unlike in the past—the security forces made little effort to contain 
the violence, it began to escalate rapidly.  In other words, once the violence had started by 
dynamics of  its own, the security forces recognized that it served their interests and therefore 
deliberately let it spin out of  control in order to create an impression of  ineffectiveness of  the 
government and the need for security forces to assume a greater political role in maintaining 
internal order and national unity.
Such instrumentalist explanations also underlie political science and anthropological 
theories of  ethnic conflict that view such conflicts as the result of  competition between politi-
cal elites that seek to manipulate ethnic identities to advance their own political interests 
either by mobilizing support for themselves or by creating disunity and dividing support for 
their opponents.  Peluso and Hoban12, for example, point to the precedent of  the anti-Chinese 
violence of  the 1960s, which is now generally acknowledged to have been instigated by the 
military, and asks why the anti-Madurese violence of  the 1990s was deliberately “allowed to 
explode out of  control with no apparent attempt at resolution or prevention”.
The security forces, on the other hand, countered accusations of  exploiting the conflict 
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for their own advantage by claiming that they were unable to control the conflict because 
their resources were stretched and they had reduced powers thus blaming the political leader-
ship of  the groups for the conflict.  Indeed all the three major outbreaks of  violence occurred 
around election times: the February 1997 clashes occurred during the campaign for the May 
national election, the March–April violence in Sambas preceded the June 1999 national elec-
tion, and the March 2001 conflict in Sampit occurred after the elections for a new provincial 
governor and the security forces blamed competing political party leaders for instigating 
the riots during election time.  Dayak leaders were suspected of  whipping up anti-Madurese 
feelings to mobilize Dayak electoral support.  The violence started with a minor incident at a 
concert organized as part of  an election campaign by the ruling GOLKAR party in Sanggau 
Ledo on 6th December 1996.  A young Dayak man saw two Madurese boys harassing a 
Dayak girl, and when they did not heed his warnings to stop, he knocked their heads together. 
Later in the month at another concert the two Madurese recognized the same Dayak man and 
with a group of  other Madurese, attacked him.  Rumours spread that he had died and several 
days of  violence and counter-violence occurred in which about 20 people died before the 
security forces were able to contain the violence just before Ramadan.  But after Ramadan the 
Madurese retaliated by attacking buildings belonging to a Christian Dayak NGO, including a 
school hostel where two girls were stabbed.
In Central Kalimantan the province’s most prominent Dayak leader K.M. Usop, an 
Indian-trained retired philosophy professor and former rector of  Palangkaraya University, 
was arrested on charges of  instigating the violence.  He had just lost the election for the pro-
vincial governorship and two of  his associates, who were leading members of  a NGO which 
he headed, subsequently lost their positions in a reorganization of  the provincial government. 
These two were accused by the police of  paying a group of  Dayaks 20 million rupiah to kill 
the five Madurese whose murder set off  the Madurese ‘take-over’ of  Sampit.  The alleged 
motive behind stirring up unrest was to destabilise the political situation by causing embar-
rassment to the incoming provincial administration.
3. 3. Scapegoat Theories
A different set of  narratives reduces the violence to an economic conflict for scarce 
resources between poor Dayaks and poor Madurese.  Dove13, for example, an anthropologist 
with long research experience in West Kalimantan writes about the violence in 1997 that 
 12 Peluso, Nancy Lee & Rosemary Hoban. “Myths of  Headhunters”, San Francisco Chronicle (13th 
March 2001). See also: Nancy Peluso. “Territorializing Ethnicity through Violence: The Case of  
West Kalimantan”, Paper presented at the workshop on ‘Violent Conflict in Indonesia’, University 
of  Melbourne, 6–7 July 2000.
 13 Dove, Michael. “Dayak Anger Ignored”, Inside Indonesia No. 51, July, 1997. pp. 13–14.
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“The recent so-called ‘ethnic conflicts’ between Dayak and Madurese in West Kalimantan 
are a classic example of  economic tensions manifested as ethnic tensions.”  Similarly, Lucia 
Cargill, an anthropologist who conducted fieldwork in Central Kalimantan, described the 
March 2001 conflict in a contribution to the Borneo Research Council Discussion Group as “a 
result of  poor people fighting over scarce resources.”14  Writing from a strictly Marxist per-
spective, Peter Symonds sees “the real reasons for the breakup of  traditional Dayak society 
lie in government policy and the operation of  the profit system…. Dayaks were increasingly 
forced to live on the edge of  the towns and came into conflict with the Madurese settlers, who 
were often as poor as themselves, over government jobs and small business… the Madurese 
in Kalimantan were made scapegoats for the lack of  jobs and rising levels of  poverty.”15
Such Marxist-inspired explanations see the ultimate causes of  the conflict in the develop-
ment policies of  the Suharto’s New Order, particularly land development and transmigration 
policies.  The ‘development’ of  natural resources through logging, plantations and mining 
has deprived the Dayaks of  land to practise shifting cultivation and indeed their traditional 
way of  life, which is inextricably tied up with the forest materially and spiritually.  At the 
same time, the transmigration policy moved people from overcrowded parts of  the coun-
try, such as Java and Madura, to low density areas like Kalimantan to work in plantations 
and new agricultural projects, many of  which were ill-planned and later abandoned pushing 
many transmigrants into the informal urban sector.  As a result the Dayaks were left margin-
alized with not enough land to practice their traditional way of  life, and not enough jobs to 
participate fully in the ‘modern’ way of  life.  Dayaks and Madurese therefore compete for the 
little land and few jobs that are available for those at the bottom of  society.
The ethnic conflict in Kalimantan put anthropologists and activists working with the 
Dayaks in a difficult moral situation.  On the one hand, it is one of  the main purposes of  
anthropology to deconstruct notions of  ‘primitiveness’ and ‘savagery’ but, on the other hand, 
in this case the very societies whose complexity and sophistication anthropologists sought 
to convey in their work, seemed to confirm the worst misconceptions of  “savage” cannibals 
and headhunters.
How should anthropologists react when “their” people stand accused of  perpetrating 
massacres and ethnic cleansing?  How should an American anthropologist (and most anthro-
pologists who have worked in Kalimantan are American) react to TIME magazine’s (March 
12, 2001) cover photograph of  a Dayak holding a weapon and two beheaded bodies lying on 
the road behind him above the headline “Bloody Borneo: A massacre and cannibalism strike 
 14 Lucia Cargill. Borneo Research Council Discussion Group (www.sarawak.com.mv/org/BRC) (28th 
February 2001).
 15 Symonds, Peter. “Racial Killings in Borneo: a symptom of  deep-seated social tensions”, World 
Socialist Website (wsws.org).
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at the heart of  Indonesia”?  The article went on to describe the events:
Indonesia’s central Kalimantan province reverted to the law of  the jungle when indigenous 
Dayaks, celebrated in tourism brochures for their tribal customs and picturesque, dormitory-style 
long-houses, went on a coordinated spree of  murder against the province’s migrant community 
from the arid island of  Madura.  And concepts like rule of  law began to seem completely irrelevant 
when the Dayaks, following their traditional custom, began eating the body parts of  their victims 
to gain spiritual strength.
“They cut off  their heads and put them in sacks.  And then they sliced them open and took out 
their hearts, and then...”  Halerin pinches his fingers together and motions toward his mouth, the 
Indonesian gesture for eating.  “The children and women were first.  I even saw a baby being 
chopped.  Maybe one month old at the most.”
“They cut off  their heads and then cut them up and took them away to eat.  There were a lot of  
Madurese in Sanggau.  Now 95% of  us are dead.”
“Perhaps there’s no other explanation than the simple word ...: evil.”
Most anthropologists who have done research in Kalimantan have worked among Dayak 
communities and feel empathy for the plight of  the Dayak and the destruction of  their cul-
ture.  But the fact that the same people appear in the global media as perpetrators of  horrific 
cruelties leaves them in a moral dilemma.  This could be felt in the internet discussion group 
of  the Borneo Research Council, where for a while after the violence began there was no men-
tion of  it until one member pointed out that scholars of  Borneo should really have something 
to say about the violence.  Reactions were somewhat muted and generally defensive of  the 
Dayaks as victims, outright condemnations were reserved for government policies and the 
mass media, whose sensationalist coverage was blamed for further inflaming the violence. 
Cargill, an anthropologist with long experience in Central Kalimantan, protested to CNN and 
BBC about the use of  the term “ethnic cleaning” in relation to the Dayak campaign to evict the 
Madurese from Kalimantan, arguing that what happened in Kalimantan could not be com-
pared to the organized killing and expulsion of  ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia.
3. 4. Indigenous Theories
The Dayaks and Madurese were well aware of  the coverage of  the conflict in the national 
and even international media and both the Dayak and Madurese intelligentsia, including soci-
ologists and anthropologists, became involved in the discussions and began contesting some 
of  the theoretical narratives of  outside observers.  Structural explanations in particular, such 
as Marxist position which reduces the conflict to economic competition, were widely rejected 
by both Dayaks and Madurese.  Without completely denying the importance of  political and 
economic factors, they saw cultural differences as more important.
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3. 4. 1. Envy Theory
In contrast to structural explanations that place both the Madurese and Dayaks together 
at the bottom of  the socio-economic ladder in competition for scarce resources with each 
other, the Madurese themselves proudly content that they have been economically more 
successful than the Dayaks and have thus become the victims of  Dayak envy.  They attri-
bute their relative economic success to cultural differences: their self-representation seems 
to come straight out of  Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’: religious devotion, hard work and regu-
lar saving are believed to define the Madurese ‘character’.  The Madurese sociologist Abdul 
Latief  Wiyata, for example, characterised them in the following terms: “The Madurese are 
hard workers and have a strong grip on old traditions that are rich in Islamic teachings”16. 
Prominent Madurese community leader and businessman in Pontianak, Haji Sulaiman, who 
headed the West Kalimantan Chamber of  Commerce, was reported in a newspaper interview 
claiming that “there’s also social envy.  Madurese live better, we’re hard-working.  Say there’s 
unproductive land; Malays neglect it, but the Madurese take it over and make it productive. 
They also say Madurese are stingy.  Well, we save and in the end, we can buy nice houses, 
wear gold, and go on hajj.”17 Their character is believed to have been shaped by their life in 
Madura, an overpopulated and arid island where life was hard.  The struggle for survival 
under harsh conditions shaped a character of  hard work effort, self-discipline and competi-
tiveness that gave them an advantage over the Dayaks.
In the Madurese conception, the Dayaks and Malays are cast as the very opposite of  
themselves, namely as the ‘lazy natives’.  Dayak lack self-discipline and are socially easy-
going and religiously undistinguished if  they are Muslim, and worse if  they are not.  Again 
there is a corresponding ‘environmental’ explanation for these charcteristics: in contrast to 
infertile and overcrowded Madura, the Dayak way of  life developed on the sparsely popu-
lated and the (once) luscious Bornean jungles.  Of  course both these ethnic stereotypes have 
a long history that goes back to colonial representations of  natives.18
3. 4. 2. Clash of Cultures
In Dayak narratives cultural differences also overshadow structural factors.  The Dayaks 
tend to view the Madurese as prone to violence; this is symbolised by the term carok which 
is central to Madurese culture - at least that is the way the Dayak see it.  In the most literal 
sense the term carok refers to a small knife reputedly carried by Madurese men which is thus 
a material symbol of  the Madurese aggressive nature.  More generally carok refers to the way 
 16 “A glimpse of  the Madurese and Dayak in Kalimantan”, Jakarta Post (6th August 2001).
 17 Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Globe (25th April 1999).
 18 de Jonge, Huub. “Stereotypes of  the Madurese” in: Kees van Dijk, Huub de Jonge, Elly Towen-
Bouwsma. Across Madura Strait: The Dynamics of  Insular Society. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995. 
Syed Hussain Alatas. The Myth of  the Lazy Native. London: Frank Cass, 1977.
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inter-personal relations are handled and disputes are settled in Madurese culture by recourse 
to actual or threatened use of   violence and an emphasis on defending one’s honour and 
competitive masculinity.19  In the context of  Dayak culture, carok gives the Madurese an anti-
social ‘ethnic character’, i.e. as aggressive and prone to violence.  As is not uncommon in these 
kinds of  stereotypes, the list of  anti-social characteristics even includes physical attributes, 
like smell.  During the violence, Dayaks setting up roadblocks were said to have recognized 
their Madurese victims by their smell.  Like the Madurese stereotype of  the Dayaks as lazy 
natives, so the latter’s stereotype of  the Madurese has a long history and is rooted in colonial 
construction of  the colonized subjects.  This stereotype is very pervasive: not only does it 
have a long history, but it is also widely shared by different ethnic groups in Kalimantan and 
indeed is common elsewhere in Indonesia and therefore seems to create a shared understand-
ing.  Its pervasiveness reinforces its plausibility.
Dayaks contrast the putative aggressive competitiveness of  the Madurese with the 
emphasis on the maintenance of  order and harmony in Dayak culture.  Definitive of  Dayak 
cultures is their system of  customary laws (adat), which is both an unwritten constitution 
of  their society as well as their sacred unwritten ‘scripture’: it not only defines relationships 
among humans but also the relationship between humans and the natural and supernatural 
worlds.  The particular rules of  adat may vary from community to community, but the notion 
that it constitutes an ordered social and natural universe is shared by all of  them.
However, adat is not only a matter of  governing internal relations within Dayak society 
and between the society and its environment and the universe, but it has become a symbol 
of  Dayak identity in a wider rapidly evolving socio-political landscape.  At a time when most 
aspects of  Dayak society have effectively ceased to exist or been devalued and marginal-
ized, adat serves as a symbol of  ‘Dayakness’.  Their traditional subsistence mode of  shifting 
cultivation has been declared as environmentally destructive and economically inefficient 
and legislation has opened up their land for ‘development’ through logging and plantations. 
Their longhouses came under suspicion as communist collectives after the 1967 anticom-
munist purges and have disappeared from West and Central Kalimantan.  Their traditional 
political organisation has been replaced by a uniform national village administrative system 
derived from the Javanese system of  village administration.  Their religion was denigrated 
first by Christian missionaries and then by the Indonesian state, which at first refused to 
recognize it as a religion, and regarded its followers as communist atheists, and then in 1980 
declared it as Kaharingan, a form of  Hinduism.  Like many indigenous societies elsewhere, 
little remains of  Dayak society as a functioning socio-economic system, except their culture, 
 19 Smith, Glenn. “Carok Violence in Madura”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of  the American 
Anthropological Association, San Francisco, Nov. 1996. (quoted in Human Rights Watch Report: 
Communal Violence in West Kalimantan).
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i.e. languages, mythologies, rituals and customs.  These are the last line of  defense that seems 
to separate their culture from oblivion.
For the Dayaks the problem with the Madurese is rooted in the latter’s refusal to abide 
by adat.  Not only do they violate the adat laws, which would in principle be a matter involv-
ing only the offender and the victim (i.e. a ‘civil’ matter), but they refuse to accept the regime 
of  sanctions and procedures required by adat to re-establish ordered social relations, which 
makes it a much more profound offense that involves the Dayaks as a collectivity.  Although 
murder, rape or theft are serious violation of  adat, the disturbance of  order they cause can 
be corrected through the performance of  prescribed social and ritual procedures.  But refusal 
to submit to these procedures and sanctions places the offender outside the ordered social 
universe that is defined by adat.  Behind every single instance of  communal violence, the 
Dayak recount a long history of  violations of  adat by Madurese, such as murder or rape, and 
a subsequent refusal to follow the prescribed adat procedures of  restitution.
The Madurese not only refuse to recognize sacred Dayak adat, they are also believed to 
escape the operation of  the state’s law.  The histories of  communal violence recounted by the 
Dayak are full of  cases in which Madurese criminals allegedly with the collusion of  the police 
managed to escape formal justice.  From the Dayak point of  view the Madurese therefore 
place themselves outside any ordered social universe, be it defined by traditional adat or state 
law.  This distinguishes the Madurese from other migrant communities: for example, in the 
1967 anti-Chinese violence, when several Dayak leaders were killed in the most brutal fashion 
by the military, which spread the rumour that they had been killed by Chinese guerillas, the 
Chinese community made ritual compensation payments to the Dayak to settle the dispute 
even though they were not guilty.20
For the Dayak adat and carok are the symbols of  a clash of  cultures that hold opposing 
values and can therefore not co-exist in the same society.  Because of  constant violations of  
adat by the Madurese, the Dayak say they had no choice but to fight a war and expel the 
Madurese.  For them fighting the Madurese was not a matter of  choice, but a requirement 
of  adat.  It is more than mere self-defence by those who have been attacked, because it is 
motivated by a sense of  outrage at the violation of  Dayak culture.  Not to uphold adat would 
mean the collapse of  all order.  A report by Human Rights Watch puts it this way “The 
bloody conflict ... came about as the need for the Dayak to fulfill the obligations and demands 
of  the adat, or indigenous laws.  Failure to do so would have resulted in great misfortune 
being experienced by the whole of  Dayak community.”21 The theme of  being forced rather 
than deciding to fight repeats itself  in various ways in Dayak accounts of  the violence.  Thus 
 20 Communal Violence in West Kalimantan, Human Rights Watch (1997). (www.hrw.org/reports/
wkali)
 21 “The Role of  Adat in the Dayak & Madurese War”, Kalimantan Review, Vol. 2 (November 1999).
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many Dayak warriors said they did not understand what they were doing and why they were 
doing it, and believed themselves—and are widely believed by other Dayak—to have been 
possessed by spirits during the fighting.  There were also reports that the swords (mandau) 
used for decapitating the enemies were not held by the Dayak fighters themselves, but flew 
out of  their hands on their own towards the victims.
The Dayaks define the conflict with the Madurese as a ‘war’, that is a situation where all 
other means of  conflict resolution have failed and rules that normally regulate social life no 
longer apply.  If  adat defines society, then Madurese violations of  adat and their rejection of  
conflict resolution procedures prescribed by adat, is a declaration of  war.  The violence was 
therefore symbolically cast in the forms of  traditional Dayak war.  The fighting was usually 
preceded by the handing around of  the ‘red bowl’, a traditional Dayak ritual of  war, and the 
fighters wore red headbands as a symbol of  warriors.  The violence itself  took many forms, 
much of  it the ordinary ugly violence of  shootings, stabbings and arson, but there were also 
acts of  violence that resurrected memories of  traditional tribal wars involving headhunting 
(which was outlawed by the Dutch a century earlier) and cannibalism.  “Headhunting in itself  
is not bad” as one Dayak school teacher and NGO activist in Pontianak told me in June 2001, 
“it is just like shooting down a warplane that attacks your country.”
3. 5. The Dayak critiques of anthropology theories
Dayak intellectual and political leaders have not only developed their own clash of  cul-
tures theory but also critiques of  alternative theories.  They generally seek to refute any 
explanation that reduces their antagonism to the Madurese to economic terms pointing to 
a number of  facts: firstly, the economically most successful community are the Chinese, 
but relations between Dayak and Chinese have been good (with the exception of  the 1967 
conflict that is now generally attributed by historians to manipulation by the army).  The 
Dayak writer Riska Orpa Sari summarises the argument: “For years, others have accused the 
Dayaks of  envy.  But if  we envied people for living a better life, we would envy the Chinese, 
Malaysians, Javanese or Balinese who also live among us.”22  Secondly, the Madurese are only 
one of  the transmigrant communities in Kalimantan besides Javanese, Batak, Minangkabau, 
Bugis and Balinese as well as a sizeable community of  Banjarese from South Kalimantan in 
Central Kalimantan.  But there have been no comparable conflicts with the other communi-
ties, and in some cases these communities are said to have sided with the Dayaks against the 
Madurese.  In the Sambas violence, for example, Malays, Bugis and even Chinese all sided 
with the Dayaks against the Madurese.  The Dayak therefore argue that this is not just a con-
flict between Dayaks and Madurese, but a conflict between the Madurese, on the one hand, 
and all other communities, both indigenous and transmigrant, on the other hand.
 22 Riska Orpa Sari. “Leave us in Peace”, Globe and Mail (9th March 2001).
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The Dayak rejection of  economic conflict theories is more than just a question of  the 
‘facts’ contradicting a theory.  During the Central Kalimantan People’s Congress which was 
held in Palangkaraya in June 2001 following the violence, the suggestion by an Indonesian 
sociologist that the root of  the problem was competition for scarce resources received 
a very hostile reception from an audience representing Dayak communities from all over 
Kalimantan.  In a more academic context, Dove’s (1997) analysis of  the Sambas conflict as a 
classic example of  economic competition manifesting itself  as ethnic tensions and published 
in the monthly magazine ‘Indonesia Today’ became the subject of  a sharp critique by Dayak 
intellectuals working for the Institute of  Dayakology in Pontianak in a paper23 presented at 
the INFID conference in Bonn, Germany held in 1998 and subsequently published in  Institute 
of  Dayakology’s magazine Kalimantan Review: “Whilst the marginalisation of  the Dayak 
through the development and political process is a factor that cannot be overlooked, it is 
interesting to note that you never hear a Dayak talk about the conflict in those terms.”
This remarkable paper accuses “experts and advocates” of  committing the arch sin of  
anthropology, namely that of  ignoring the “native point of  view”.  It argues that “an axiom 
of  anthropology” had thereby been violated, namely the idea “that people perceive the world 
in widely differing ways and that they also behave on the basis of  these perceptions.”  Instead 
of  taking the people’s (i.e. Dayak) perception into account, these explanations are based on 
the “perspective of  ‘experts’ and ‘advocates’, which [are] sometimes ungrounded, and far 
from the everyday reality as felt by the people.”  It goes on to argue that this is yet another 
example in a long history of  “the subjectification of  the Dayak through discourses external 
to the Dayak themselves [which] is not a recent phenomenon.  Indeed, it is the history of  
colonialism, past and present.”
Against rationalist and instrumentalist theories of  the conflict in terms of  competition 
for political and economic resources, it calls for putting the native point of  view at the cen-
tre, i.e. to look at the conflict through the categories of  Dayak culture instead of  imposing 
universalist assumptions about the nature of  conflicts.  But surprisingly it then goes on to 
assert the impossibility to communicate this “native point of  view” to outsiders, be they sym-
pathetic anthropologists, hostile Madurese or the supposedly neutral government.  Here the 
“axiom of  anthropology that people perceive the world in widely differing ways and that they 
behave on the basis of  these perceptions” is turned against anthropology (if  we define it as 
the interpretation of  culture) because “these perceptions may represent insuperable barriers 
to understanding”:
Just how does one explain to outsiders, particularly those of  a liberal rationalist background, 
 23 Institute of  Dayakology Research and Development. “The Role of  Adat in the Dayak & Madurese 
War”, Kalimantan Review Vol. 2 (November 1999), 39–44.
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about facts that do not fit the usual styles and forms of  language, the categories of  representa-
tion, and the binary oppositions that establish conceptual order?  How does one explain about 
what is beyond time and space, inside and outside, dead and alive, good and evil, without it being 
reduced to “black magic”, as opposed to the “white” variety of  accepted mainstream religions, or 
the “primitive”, as opposed to “civilized”?  Reports have until now presumed the presence of  ratio-
nal thought, people acting with intent and logic in an irrational manner, and on the basis of  those 
actions being labeled as “headhunters” and “cannibals”.24
Of  course at one level such radical cultural relativism can be seen as a self-serving excuse 
for the shocking acts of  violence committed by some Dayaks.  By removing headhunting and 
cannibalism from a common moral universe and contextualising them in a separate Dayak 
cultural universe, such practices are made incomprehensible to outsiders and any attempt to 
explain or judge them would then disqualify itself  as again “the subjectification of  the Dayak 
through discourses external to the Dayak themselves”.
The irony of  the argument is of  course that this anthropologically sophisticated asser-
tion of  the futility of  communicating the “native point of  view” gets its point across very 
effectively.  But that is really besides the point here: what this document really does is that it 
gives intellectual expression to a profound sense of  alienation among the Dayak generally, a 
sense that their point of  view is never taken seriously—whether by sympathetic anthropolo-
gists (‘experts’), well-meaning NGOs (‘advocates’), concerned (in the dual sense of  the word) 
government agencies, or the media in search of  a sensational story.  It bears testimony to 
a deep sense of  not being understood by others because these others do not really want to 
understand, and therefore it becomes futile to try to communicate with them and to partici-
pate in the development of  a common narrative.  Conspicuous and archaic forms of  violence, 
such as ‘headhunting’ and ‘cannibalism’, then become a means of  communicating their alien-
ation where other forms of  communication have failed.
 24 Institute of  Dayakology Research and Development. “The Role of  Adat in the Dayak & Madurese 
War”, Kalimantan Review Vol. 2 (November 1999), 39–44.
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